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Abstract:  The on-going Syrian civil war calls for a re-evaluation of using force to protect 
human rights. This article does not rake over the much-debated issue of whether a right of 
humanitarian intervention exists as lex lata. Instead, it addresses the little reviewed normative 
issue of whether the right should exist in international law to support and reflect a pluralistic 
understanding of sovereignty. Despite advancements in international human rights law, 
international humanitarian law and international criminal law, this wider fabric of international 
law preserves Westphalian sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. It denies any 
right of humanitarian intervention.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The on-going humanitarian tragedies of the Syrian civil war call for a re-evaluation of using 
force to protect human rights. Now, over five years into the conflict, this call remains as loud 
and relevant as ever. That military action might be used to save lives is an idea long espoused 
in international law. In modern times, the debate regarding the existence of such right is framed 
within the boundaries of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) and the collective 
security system. In this context, a right of humanitarian intervention refers to an independent 
legal basis, absent State consent, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization or 
justifications of self-defence, for a State to use unilateral military force to protect individuals 
from egregious breaches of human rights occurring in a third State. 1 
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1 Art 2(4) UN Charter prohibits the ‘threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state’. In addition to State consent, the only explicit exceptions to this prohibition in the UN Charter are 
the inherent right of self-defence under Art 51 UN Charter and force authorized by the UNSC pursuant to Chapter 
VII UN Charter. 
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Much of the debate has focused on the lex lata. That is to say the question of whether 
current international law recognizes the right of humanitarian intervention, based on State 
practice, that might give rise to a customary norm and/or a reinterpretation of the UN Charter. 
Whilst by no means settled, the better view is that there is no clear right of humanitarian 
intervention in international law.2 This article does not seek to add to this particular existential 
debate. Instead, regardless of the lex lata position, its focus is on the normative question of 
whether, as part of the wider fabric of international law, there should be a right of humanitarian 
intervention. In so doing, it addresses the invitation by Daniel Bethlehem in 2013 to knit 
together various threads of international legal practice to establish a ‘tapestry argument’ for 
such right.3  
Tackling this issue requires an examination of the tensions that humanitarian intervention 
raises between State sovereignty on the one hand and the preservation of human rights on the 
other. Central to this analysis is how international law increasingly recognizes the need to 
safeguard human beings. As part of this trend, this article explores certain of Bethlehem’s core 
‘threads’, these being developments since World War II in international human rights law 
(IHRL), international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL). Together, 
these advancements point to a paradigm shift in the foundations of international law that 
emphasizes the security of persons and peoples instead of only States.  
The key question to be examined is whether this evolution in the fabric of international law 
has affected the nature and extent of State sovereignty to such a degree that a right of 
humanitarian intervention should exist to reflect and support it. We will see that there has 
indeed been movement away from State centrism to a more pluralistic understanding of 
sovereignty. This ‘pluralistic view’ of sovereignty is one that increasingly recognizes the 
importance of human beings and their security, in addition to the traditional focus on States. It 
also requires sovereignty to be viewed as conditional on respecting and securing humanitarian 
protections. However, whilst a right of humanitarian intervention might initially appear 
attractive to protect and promote these developments, such a conclusion goes too far. 
Significantly, secondary rules of international law that relate to the enforcement of primary 
norms and respond to their violation are not supportive of the right. Instead, these secondary 
rules retain States as the principal actors in international law, preserving their external 
sovereignty and the attendant principle of non-intervention. By doing so, international law 
prioritizes other concerns, such as the comity of States and international peace and security, 
                                                        
2 For a recent summary of the issues and relevant State practice, see S Rodley, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ in M 
Weller (ed), Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 775. In 
terms of the latest State practice, Syria represents an opportunity lost for those, like Koh, who support such a right 
and was looking to Syrian intervention as a law making moment to crystallise a new norm of customary 
international law.  H Koh, ‘Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the 
Way Forward)’ (EJIL: Talk!,  4 October 2013) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/syria-and-the-law-of-humanitarian-
intervention-part-ii-international-law-and-the-way-forward/>. Instead, Syria points to the contrary, suggesting a 
halt to any supposed momentum behind customary development. When military action finally occurred, it was 
not based on humanitarian intervention. The governments of the United States, Canada, Turkey, UK, Australia 
and France instead justified their military response against Daesh/ ISIS in Syria on the basis of individual self-
defence and/or the collective self-defence of Iraq. See UN Doc S/2014/695 (23 September 2014) (United States), 
UN Doc S/2015/221 (31 March 2015) (Canada), UN Doc S/2015/563 (24 July 2015) (Turkey), UN Doc 
S/2015/688 (7 September 2015) (UK), UN Doc S/2015/693 (9 September 2015) (Australia), UN Doc S/2015/745 
(9 September 2015) (France). Russia’s intervention was based President Assad’s consent. ‘Russia joins war in 
Syria: Five key points’, BBC News (1 October 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
34416519>. See further A Henriksen and M Schack, ‘The Crisis in Syria and Humanitarian Intervention’ (2014) 
1 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 122.  
3  D Bethlehem, ‘Stepping Back a Moment – The Legal Basis in Favour of a Principle of Humanitarian 
Intervention’ (EJIL: Talk!, 12 September 2013) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-
basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention/>. 
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even if this is to the detriment of human rights. On a close review, the threads of Bethlehem’s 
tapestry argument are in fact inimical to a right of humanitarian intervention. In addition, we 
must recognize the difficulties that surround the practical application of coercive military force 
for humanitarian purposes and the inherent dangers of its abuse. These raise significant 
concerns regarding the possible effect of humanitarian intervention on international law more 
generally. This putative right simply does not fit within this broader framework. The result is 
that the broad prohibition on the use of force holds true and this should remain. International 
law should not recognize a right of humanitarian intervention. 
  
II. THE NORMATIVE CLAIM 
 
Bethlehem has pointed to certain trends in international law that might establish a right of 
humanitarian intervention. His argument is based on a ‘tapestry’ of threads of practice, which 
includes the responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P) State practice, the human rights objectives 
of the UN and shifts in international law that he perceives to be supportive of the right. 4 These 
shifts also include developments in IHRL, IHL and ICL. Along the same lines, Teitel speaks 
of ‘humanity law’, arguing that there has been a paradigm shift in international law from 
emphasizing State security to the security of persons and peoples.5 The focus of this section, 
and the article more generally, is the role that this claim of a ‘paradigm shift’ plays in respect 
of a right to use force outside of the explicit parameters of the UN Charter. Assessing this claim 
requires an analysis of the changing nature of State sovereignty and the progression from a 
purely State-centric conception of international law to one where individuals are increasingly 
the focus. The question therefore is how far does a modern understanding of sovereignty take 
us, in terms of whether international law should recognize a right of humanitarian intervention 
to reflect and support these developments?  
 
A. Sovereignty and State centrism 
 
The classical positivist conception of international law and State sovereignty poses significant 
challenges to a putative right of humanitarian intervention. Such a right is juxtaposed against 
a commitment to State sovereignty that is often associated with the Peace of Westphalia 1648 
and the attendant principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention.6  In the Vattelian 
tradition, 7  positivism premised that States were the exclusive and equal subjects of an 
international law that only regulated the rights and duties of States in relation to each other.8 
The meaning and extent of the notion of ‘sovereignty’ is a dynamic and much debated subject.9 
                                                        
4 Bethlehem (n 3). He is backed by commentators such as Koh (n 2).  
5 R G Teitel, Humanity’s Law (Oxford University Press 2011). 
6 Positivism as a jurisprudential ideology really took hold in the 19th century. This ‘positive revolution’ put the 
will and consent of States (rather than divine or natural law) at the centre of international rule making. See e.g. S 
C Neff in M D Evans (ed), International Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 13-17 for a further 
discussion of this development. For an overview of the Peace of Westphalia and its impact on the evolution of 
international law and the rise of the sovereign State, see e.g. L Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’ 
(1948) 42(1) AJIL 240. 
7 E Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations 
and Sovereigns (1797, reprinted, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). 
8 L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I (Hersch Lauterpacht (ed), 7th edn, Longmans, Green & Co. 
1952) 341. 
9 L Henkin, ‘That S Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera’ (1999) 68 Fordham 
Law Review 1; N Schrijver, ‘The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty’ (2000) 70(1) B.Y.I.L. 65, 69-72; M 
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For present purposes however, external sovereignty10 is usually understood as the ability of 
States to act on the international plane on an equal basis with other States and without 
interference in their internal affairs by any higher legal authority or other State (other than by 
consent).11 This classic model of sovereignty thereby evokes an image of a protective shell that 
surrounds and shields the internal affairs of the State from the outside world. Whilst by no 
means an absolute layer of protection, it suggests a degree of opacity or impermeability that 
insulates the State from external scrutiny and interference. It leaves them largely unconstrained 
in terms of what they may do within their own borders, subject only to international law to 
which they have consented or which is jus cogens. 
This idea of external sovereignty was first espoused in a time when there was a limited 
conception of individual rights. Consequentially, the rights of States were placed above those 
of individuals, who were viewed as objects, rather than subjects, of international law.12 In 
addition, external sovereignty guaranteed the inviolability of a State’s borders, denying any 
right of intervention, let alone humanitarian intervention, in the event that a State mistreated 
those on its territory. We have moved away from this strict positivist view however, to a 
modern understanding of external sovereignty that counters, to some extent, both of these 
consequences. First, whilst States may be the primary actors, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) recognized relatively quickly after the creation of the UN that there may be other subjects 
of international law that are not States.13 Such view has since developed, with much being 
written about the increased significance of non-State actors (NSAs) within the international 
legal order and how the balance between individual and State interests has been readjusted in 
favour of the former. Indeed, some commentators have gone so far as to argue that the primary 
subject of international law is now the individual and not the State. Lauterpacht and 
McCorquodale for example have posited that human rights are superior to those of the 
sovereign State.14 This developed understanding of sovereignty will be discussed below in 
respect of advancements in the primary rules of IHRL, IHL and ICL.  
Secondly, it is true that the principle of non-intervention remains a cornerstone of modern 
international law. The Friendly Relations Declaration reminds us that ‘[n]o state or group of 
states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal 
or external affairs of any other state.’15 However, this principle must be viewed in the light of 
                                                        
Koskenniemi, Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge University Press 
2006) 228-45.   
10 Koskenniemi, ibid 240-5; D Held, ‘Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty’ (2002) 8 
Legal Theory 1, 3-4. In contrast, internal sovereignty speaks to the make-up of a State and its exclusive authority 
over its territory and people. Crawford calls this ‘a monopoly of governing authority’, J Crawford and M 
Koskenniemi, The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 120.  
11 Schrijver (n 9); Held, ibid 3; J Crawford (ed), Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2008) 447-8.  
12 See further, R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford University Press 
1994) 48-55. 
13 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 178-
179.  
14 H Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (Stevens & Sons 1950) 67-72; R McCorquodale in Evans 
(n 6) 301. For further discussion of the importance of NSAs in the sovereignty calculus and the rebalancing in 
favour of human beings, see M Reisman ‘Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law’ 
(1990) 84 AJIL 866; L Henkin ‘Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”’ (1995-6) 25 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 31; A Peters ‘Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty’ (2003) 20 EJIL 513; 
Schrijver (n 9) 88-9; Teitel (n 5); K N Trapp, ‘Actor-pluralism, the ‘turn to responsibility’ and the jus ad bellum: 
‘unwilling or unable’ in context’ (2015) 2 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 199. 
15 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970) (Friendly Relations 
Declaration). This is subject to the right of self-defence under Art 51 UN Charter and to UNSC authorized 
enforcement action under Charter VII UN Charter. 
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a modern understanding of sovereignty, which no longer constitutes an absolute shield of 
protection from the observation, criticism and reaction of third States and international 
organisations. It is conditional, carrying with it certain obligations and responsibilities towards 
individuals. The contemporary position is that each State must ‘respect the dignity and basic 
rights of all the people within the state’16 and has ‘the responsibility to protect its populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.17 Under this much-
celebrated R2P formulation, where a State fails in its responsibility to protect, the international 
community has reserved the right, as a last resort, to take collective forcible action through the 
UN to enforce it. 
In respect of how far this re-characterization of sovereignty goes and whether it is 
supportive of a right of humanitarian intervention, it must first be noted that R2P is a political 
doctrine and not a formal or even material source of international law.18 Moreover, the use of 
force is a last resort under this principle and, relying as it does on Chapter VII UN Charter 
authorization, by definition it is not (unilateral) humanitarian intervention. Crucially, the 
World Summit Outcome Document did not endorse ICISS’s proposal that where the UNSC 
did not act militarily for human protection purposes, then the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
(under the Uniting for Peace Resolution19) and/or regional organisations might do so.20 
Therefore, whilst R2P contemplates that force may be used to intervene in domestic affairs to 
protect human rights, it clearly and explicitly protects the primacy of the UNSC in authorizing 
that use of force. It is also supportive of the sovereign prerogatives of States, recognizing that 
the primary responsibility to protect their citizens lies with them. The doctrine does however 
indicate some willingness (even if it is not always forthcoming) on behalf of the international 
community to monitor and enforce respect for human rights where a State fails to adhere to a 
duty to protect its own citizens. It is also indicative, as Reisman notes, of the effect of the 
human rights movement on sovereignty that has meant that the fulcrum of international law 
has shifted from the protection of sovereigns to the protection of people.21 Respect for human 
rights is becoming more mandatory and respect for sovereignty less absolute.22 States are 
therefore not the sole centres of legal power. Rather, their relations and activities are shaped 
and formed by an overarching cosmopolitan legal framework.23 These conclusions will be 
explored further in the following sections.  
 
B.  International human rights law 
 
It is in the field of IHRL where we see the biggest shift towards individuals and their security. 
This movement has had important consequences for internal sovereignty and the relationship 
between individuals and the State. More importantly for any potential right of humanitarian 
intervention however, is the effect on external sovereignty and the limitations placed on State 
power. Because of the growing importance of IHRL, States may no longer mistreat those within 
their jurisdiction and remain immune from the reaction of the wider international community. 
Mechanisms now exist to monitor State action and, in certain instances, to call States to account 
                                                        
16 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to 
Protect (2001) para 1.35. 
17 World Summit Outcome Document 2005, paras 138-9, adopted by UNGA Res A/RES/60/1 (2005).  
18 Art 38(1) Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 15 UNCIO 355. For a fuller analysis of 
the R2P doctrine and its status in international law, see e.g. Henriksen and Schack (n 2) 128-33.  
19 UNGA Res 377 (V) (1950).  
20 ICISS Report (n 16) paras 6.28 - 6.40.  
21 Resiman (n 14) 872.  
22 Statement of The Netherlands Delegate, UN Doc S/PV.4011, 12.  
23 Held (n 10) 32-33. 
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for any breaches of IHRL. The hurdle for a right of humanitarian intervention is that this inroad 
into State power only goes so far and enforcement of IHRL retains the central elements of State 
consent and focuses on peaceful dispute resolution. 
 
1. IHRL and the turn to human security 
 
Following the horrors of World War II, Article 1(3) UN Charter placed human rights and 
therefore individuals at the centre of the UN Charter system. Since then, a series of international 
human rights treaties have developed the movement to a humanity-based law.24 Most important 
are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, being binding multilateral treaties that 
sprang from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 25  Together these form the 
‘International Bill of Human Rights’. The creation of regional human rights systems, most 
notably the Inter-American and European regimes, has strengthened these important 
humanitarian foundations. This package of international and regional treaties has 
mainstreamed human rights in international law and established a series of obligations that 
States owe to individuals subject to their jurisdiction.  
The effectiveness of these treaties and institutions, including their limitations and failures, 
may certainly be debated. Grievous human rights breaches still occur and much more still needs 
to be done in this field. Yet, IHRL developments have been significant. Whilst States may 
make reservations to human rights treaties, thereby excluding or modifying their human rights 
obligations under them, by signing up to them they recognize that this subject matter is no 
longer the sole prerogative of the State. Even States with highly questionable human rights 
records submit to the Universal Periodic Review procedure by the Human Rights Council26 
and the most authoritarian of regimes would not now deny that their citizens have certain 
fundamental rights.27 At the very least, this evidences State engagement with human rights and 
recognizes the fact that international standards have replaced once-sovereign standards (or lack 
of standards).28 In addition, IHRL has raised expectations on States to adhere to these standards 
and has increasingly prioritized them in international relations. Indeed, the core of human rights 
law has been recognized by the ICJ as constituting obligations erga omnes that are therefore 
the concern of all States.29 Human rights are therefore viewed as universal and, as will be 
explored below, their growing importance has influenced the development of IHL and ICL. 
Such evolution is also evidenced in the UN’s increased willingness to concern itself with 
internal conflicts where humanitarian emergencies are present and even to characterize them 
as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression for the purpose of Article 
                                                        
24  A list of the ten core international human rights instruments and their monitoring bodies is available at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx>. 
25  Respectively, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3; UNGA Res 
A/RES/3/217 A (1948), Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
26 See e.g. Saudi Arabia’s 2013 National Report to the Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/17/SAU/1. 
27 See e.g. E Bates in D Moeckli et al, International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 37.  
28 Henkin (n 9) 4.  
29 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain); Second Phase [1970] ICJ Rep 3, 
paras 33 and 34. Section II(E)(3) considers the repercussions of this characterization.  
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39 UN Charter and its exercise of Chapter VII powers.30 Humanitarian concern is also more 
readily deployed in the language that States use to justify their actions.31 
 
2. Impact on external sovereignty 
 
IHRL’s contribution to Bethlehem’s tapestry argument and to Teitel’s conception of humanity 
law is therefore significant. In terms of internal sovereignty, the relationship between 
individuals and the State has shifted, with the balance of power and the rights of protection 
increasingly favouring the individual. Most relevant for an assessment of any right of 
humanitarian intervention however, is the effect that such movement has had on external 
sovereignty and the ability of third States and international bodies to peer through the 
previously impermeable shell of non-intervention and to monitor and attempt to enforce 
compliance with human rights norms. In this regard, States have established a network of treaty 
monitoring bodies and human rights courts to review the actions of States vis-à-vis 
individuals.32 Individuals in certain cases are now empowered to bring claims directly against 
States for breaches of human rights obligations. The ECHR is the best example of the control 
mechanisms that may be deployed. Together with the Inter-American system, the ECHR 
regime provides individuals with the strongest means to protect and enforce their rights at the 
international level. 33  Pursuant to Article 34 ECHR, any individuals subject to a State’s 
jurisdiction have direct access to the ECtHR to bring a claim against that State. The Court’s 
jurisdiction is compulsory (Article 32 ECHR) and its decisions binding (Article 46 ECHR).  
In respect of internal sovereignty, ECHR mechanisms constitute a powerful means by 
which individuals can challenge national laws, resulting not only in declaratory relief and 
compensation, but also remedial action. This may even include requiring legislative changes. 
In Greens for example, the UK was directed to amend legislation regarding prisoner votes. 34  
This caused a ‘mini-constitutional crisis’ in the UK, raising fears that judges were threatening 
the sovereign will of Parliament.35 That an international court may challenge State power in 
this way has important consequences for external sovereignty. It shows that deference to the 
State is not absolute. Furthermore, it allows the veil of external sovereignty to be pierced by an 
outside body deploying international laws to protect and enforce individual rights within the 
State. IHRL may therefore allow intervention into what was previously viewed as the domestic 
reserve.  
Interesting for the analysis of any right of humanitarian intervention is how this interference 
with sovereign power may apply when States act beyond their own borders, especially when 
                                                        
30  See Danish Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects 
(Gullanders, 2000) 64-72 for a discussion of this development. The latest example is UNSC Res 1973 where a 
R2P style re-characterization of sovereignty was ostensibly invoked to authorize the intervention in Libya (see n 
112 and accompanying text). 
31 Teitel (n 52) 111, describing the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. See also note 158 regarding Russia’s 
intervention in Ukraine.  
32 E.g. the Human Rights Committee that monitors implementation of the ICCPR and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), which is the standing court of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
33 This is particularly evident when contrasted with the UN Charter and international treaty systems that do not 
provide the same level of enforceability via compulsory jurisdiction and binding decisions. Similarly, the 
protection and enforcement of human rights in Africa, including via the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, face significant challenges. See M Schmidt, 
391-432, and C Heyns and M Killander, 479-497, in Moeckli et al (n 27) for an overview of these systems. 
34 Greens and M.T. v United Kingdom (2010) 53 EHRR 21.  
35 P Leach, ‘No longer offering fine mantras to a parched child? The European Court's developing approach to 
remedies’ in A Føllesdal (ed), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, 
European and Global Context (Cambridge University Press 2013) 166.  
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they take part in armed conflicts abroad. Whilst the extraterritorial application of IHRL is a 
controversial and contested subject, it is increasingly recognized that, in respect of both 
international conventions36 and regional treaties,37 where States exercise control over territory 
or persons, then human rights obligations might follow and restrain States in their actions 
abroad. In principle at least, IHRL continues to apply during armed conflicts38 and, whilst the 
exact boundaries of such concept are still being explored and debated, the judicial approach 
seems to be that ‘those who export war ought to see to the parallel export of guarantees against 
the atrocities of war’.39 Therefore, international law not only concerns itself with how States 
interact with each other, but also how States treat each other’s nationals when they are acting 
outside their own territory. Such nationals thereby receive the benefit of IHL protections (as 
discussed below) and also potentially IHRL, which might give them a right of remedial action 
against the breaching State (as was the case in Al-Skeini). This shows that IHRL increasingly 
has the potential to protect individuals wherever they are found in the world and regardless of 
which State may be mistreating them.  
These developments in IHRL appear significant for the present analysis of external 
sovereignty. However, have they rendered permeable its protective shell to such an extent that 
they point to a right for a State to export human rights protections by using force? Conceptually, 
this could be justifiable as those States that breach certain core rights lose their immunity from 
external coercive interference.40 The problem with this argument however, is how IHRL has 
developed and how it is enforced. In respect of its development, this has largely been through 
the acts of States themselves. By becoming a party to human rights treaties41 States have 
voluntarily accepted (or not) monitoring by the treaty bodies they establish, the jurisdiction of 
regional human rights courts and any restrictions on their power. The right to enter into 
international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.42 Thus, the public order nature 
of IHRL largely derives from State consent.43 Even more decisive to the inquiry is that the 
mechanisms of enforcement of the primary norms of IHRL are entirely consensual and 
peaceable. Under international treaties, such as the ICCPR, the wrongdoing State is ‘part of the 
dialogue’ with treaty monitoring bodies. Recommendations are made to States and solutions 
reached (or not) by way of mutual agreement. States may reject recommendations and no 
binding decision may be forced upon them. Even the strongest and most intrusive vehicle for 
the enforcement of human rights (being the judicial exercise of compulsory jurisdiction under 
the ECHR) relies on and preserves that consent. States have agreed to be part of a process that 
                                                        
36  In respect of the extra-territorial application of the ICCPR, see e.g. Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, Merits, 
Communication No 52/1979, UN Document CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, IHRL 2796 (UNHRC 1981); Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Advisory Opinion) [2004] 
ICJ Rep 136; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). 
37 In respect of the extra-territorial application of the Inter-American regime, see e.g. Coard et al v United 
States, Report N. 109/99 - Case 10.951, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 29 September 1999. In 
respect of the extra-territorial application of the ECHR, see e.g. Al-Skeini and others v United Kingdom (App No. 
55721/07) 7 July 2011; Smith and others v The Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41. 
38 Palestinian Wall (n 36) para 106.  
39 Al-Skeini (n 37), Opinion of Judge Bonello, para 38.  
40 J Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press 1999). 
41  Although customary international law, jus cogens and general principles may also be sources of IHRL. 
However, for analysis of the difficulties for IHRL with these sources, see B Simma and P Alston ‘The Sources of 
Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’ (1992) 12 Australian Yearbook of International 
Law 82.  
42 SS “Wimbledon” (1923) PCIJ Ser A, No 1, 25.  
43 Although elements of irrecusability may also arise in IHRL, where State consent is questionable. See H R Fabri 
in P Alston and E Macdonald (eds), Human Rights, Intervention, and The Use of Force (Oxford University Press 
2008) 50-53.  
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focuses entirely on peaceful dispute resolution.44 In both cases, the State is included in the 
pursuit of enforcing the primary norm by way of pacific settlement. This is inimical to any 
right of humanitarian intervention that entirely excludes the State from the process of 
resolution, displaces its external sovereignty and territorial integrity and uses force to do so.  
 
C. International Humanitarian Law 
 
Like IHRL, developments in IHL have also increasingly focused on human security, with 
consequential checks placed on State power. In this regard, IHL requires States to walk a fine 
line, allowing them freedoms to respond to the demands of military necessity and the 
pragmatics of war, whilst curbing their freedom of action in the name of humanitarianism.45 
IHL has witnessed a remarkable shift since World War II, restricting not only how States use 
force against each other, but also how they use force within their own borders against NSAs. 
This inroad into State sovereignty is significant. Running parallel with the general trend in 
IHRL, such developments seem potentially supportive of a right of humanitarian intervention. 
However, external sovereignty remains a check on outside interference and even though IHL 
protects individuals, breaches of it are primarily dealt with ex post facto via ICL. As with IHRL 
therefore, enforcement relies on consent and peaceful dispute resolution, which does not favour 
a right of humanitarian intervention.  
 
1. IHL and the turn to human security 
 
In terms of focusing on individuals, IHL and IHRL possess similar core goals, which include 
a common nucleus of non-derogable rights and a shared purpose of promoting life and human 
dignity.46 IHL therefore limits the means and methods of warfare (including prohibiting certain 
weapons and tactics)47 as well as protecting civilians who are not taking part in hostilities and 
combatants placed hors de combat. 48  Important for the present analysis is that two 
‘intransgressible’ principles run through the provisions of both Hague Law and Geneva Law 
and are considered customary international law.49  The first is the principle of distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants. It is aimed at protecting civilians not taking part in 
hostilities by prohibiting the targeting of them.50 The second is the prohibition of causing 
unnecessary suffering to combatants. This may be referred to as a principle of humanity, as 
                                                        
44 This will be discussed further in Section II(E). 
45 Y Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 5.  
46 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Precautionary Measures in Guantánamo Bay, 12 March 2002, 
International Legal Materials 41 (2002) 532. 
47 Principally through the law codified by The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, available 
at <http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByDate.xsp> (Hague Law).  
48 Principally via: Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; 
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva 
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (API); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 609 (APII) (Geneva Law).  
49 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, paras 78-79.  
50 This principle is codified in Art 48 API and is reinforced by the principle of proportionality that effectively 
prohibits military attacks where civilian losses would be disproportionate to the military advantage. 
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also reflected in the Martens Clause.51 A great many rules of IHL therefore are fundamental to 
the respect of the human person and to ‘elementary considerations of humanity’.52 Notable is 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions that prohibits murder, torture and cruel and 
degrading treatment. Whilst originally directed at non-international armed conflicts (NIACs),53 
this is now regarded as custom applicable to all armed conflicts and constitutes the ‘minimum 
yardstick’ of fair and humane treatment.54 IHL therefore seeks to provide a comprehensive set 
of protections for all individuals, whether combatants or civilians, who are caught up in armed 
conflict. States are obligated to respect and protect these fundamental rules and principles. 
Whether these developments are supportive of a right of humanitarian intervention however, 
depends on their impact on external sovereignty.  
 
2. Impact on external sovereignty 
 
The work of the international criminal tribunals has been instrumental to how IHL has impacted 
on external sovereignty. Paramount was the Tadić case, in which the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found that a body of customary international law 
(including elements of both Geneva Law and Hague Law) had arisen that applied to both 
international armed conflicts (IACs) and NIACs, certain violations of which might entail 
individual criminal responsibility.55 This extension of IHL and thereby ICL into NIACs was 
revolutionary. Traditionally, the focus of IHL had been on inter-State IACs, which were subject 
to a much more extensive and detailed legal framework than NIACs, which were only governed 
by Common Article 3 and AP II. This latter fact showed deference to external sovereignty and 
non-intervention because of reluctance on the part of States to allow international law to 
interfere in what are essentially domestic affairs. Yet, Tadić showed willingness by an 
international tribunal to intervene in this municipal reserve. It demonstrates that deference to 
States is not absolute and that the enforcement of IHL via custom to protect individuals and 
punish perpetrators, in certain instances, will be of higher importance. Indeed, the Appeals 
Chamber in Tadić stated that ‘a state-sovereignty-oriented approach have [sic] been gradually 
supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach.’56  
This development has its limits however. Whilst movements in customary ICL have led to 
a degree of convergence of the two IHL regimes, there has not been a ‘full and mechanical 
transplant’ of IHL relating to IACs into that relating to NIACs. Rather, the ‘general essence’ 
of those rules is applicable to NIACs.57 Therefore, whilst this decision paved the way under 
ICL for increased individual criminal responsibility during NIACs, the distinction between the 
two regimes remains. The ICC Statute58 follows this trend. It contains two possible prosecution 
regimes to reflect it, with fewer war crimes in NIACs being subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
59  There is therefore less ability in NIACs to enforce IHL and ICL norms. Such an approach 
does not reflect a model that prioritizes human security. Rather, it is indicative of the historical 
                                                        
51 Nuclear Weapons (n 49) para 78. 
52 ibid para 79. 
53 Being conflicts not of an international character. See Common Art 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Art 1(1) 
AP II.  
54 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 
para 218; Hamdan v Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) 65-70.  
55 Prosecutor v Tadić (Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) ICTY-94-1 (2 October 1995) paras 96-136.  
56 ibid para 97. 
57 ibid para 126. 
58 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (ICC Statute).  
59 Arts 8(2)(a) and (b) list war crimes applicable in IACs and Arts 8(2)(c) and (e) in NIACs. Notable, is that the 
first category constitutes a list of 34 potential war crimes whereas only 19 crimes are specified for NIACs. 
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deference that IHL has paid to States and their external sovereignty. The distinction between 
IACs and NIACs allows States to retain crucial elements of sovereign protection against 
interference by IHL and ICL.  
The result is that prosecutors and international criminal tribunals face difficult tasks in 
attempting to classify conflicts with often complex factual backgrounds that may change over 
time. The consequences of this for ICL are profound, as what particular war crimes may attach 
to conduct in any given circumstances rests entirely on such classification. The result for 
victims and the accused may therefore depend on very fine distinctions. This is unsatisfactory 
for those advocating for the protection of human security. There is a degree of momentum 
however for eliminating the two-regime system. This is supported by cases such as Tadić, in 
which the ICTY referred to the compelling humanitarian reasons for reducing, if not 
eliminating, such distinctions.60 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study 
on the customary status of IHL takes a similar view61 and Emily Crawford makes a strong case 
for unification, emphasizing the common denominator of armed conflicts, being human 
beings.62 This is in keeping with the core values of IHL and the basic protections of IHRL that, 
in principle at least, continue to apply in times of war.63 Whilst unification would therefore be 
welcome, the distinction remains for now.  
That humanitarian concerns have influenced the development of IHL may seem supportive 
of a right of humanitarian intervention. This is because force, even in times of war, is being 
constrained and what States are allowed to do towards each other and to individuals is 
increasingly limited. This is the case even if conflict occurs exclusively within the boundaries 
of a State’s own territory. These developments, insomuch as they have been advanced 
judicially, have occurred absent State consent and it is the individual that is pushed ever more 
to take the centre stage of international concern. Hamdan is a good example of this and counters 
the assertion by the second Bush administration that so-called ‘unlawful combatants’ receive 
no protections of IHL or IHRL.64 As Judge Simma has remarked, there are no legal voids in 
international law where individuals lack protection.65  As such, where IHL safeguards are 
unclear or absent, it is notable that IHRL and its principles have been drawn on in support, so 
as to avoid any deficiencies in human security.66  
Whilst the extent of the ability of IHRL to influence and fill gaps in IHL is controversial, 
for questions of sovereignty, this is significant as the ability for humanitarian concerns to 
restrict State power potentially grows. Ultimately however, these IHL developments, even 
where they draw on IHRL, do not permit States to pierce the veil of external sovereignty of 
other States or justify force being used to enforce human rights norms in such States. Nor does 
it allow a third State to intervene to prevent or stop breaches of them. Rather, enforcing IHL 
and responding to its infringement relies primarily on ascribing individual criminal 
                                                        
60 Tadić (n 55) para 126. 
61  International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005), 
available at <http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home>. 
62 E Crawford ‘Unequal before the Law: The Case for the Elimination of the Distinction between International 
and Non-international Armed Conflicts’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 441, 465.  
63 Palestinian Wall (n 36) para 106.  
64 See S Borelli, ‘Casting light on the legal black hole: International law and detentions abroad in the “war on 
terror”’ (2005) 87 International Review of the Red Cross 39, 47 et seq.  
65 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) 
(Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 168, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, para 27. 
66 See e.g The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al v The Government of Israel et al, Judgment, HCJ 
769/02, 11 December 2006; Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB). More generally, 
see K Watkin, ‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict’ 
(2004) 98 AJIL1. 
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responsibility.67 Whilst belligerent reprisals68 have long been used by States as a means to 
enforce compliance with IHL, since World War II States have increasingly sought to proscribe 
them by introducing a broad list of specific prohibitions. 69  Today, their permissibility is 
extremely limited and their deployment is highly controversial.70 Whilst not all States are party 
to API, the move away from the use of belligerent reprisals is part of a discernable trend to 
restrain the ability to use force to ensure compliance with international law. Instead, the focus 
of IHL enforcement is on ex post facto peaceable resolution, via ICL. 
 
D.  International Criminal Law 
 
The principal concern of ICL is with individuals and their protection from wide-scale 
atrocities. It thereby shares a common base with IHRL. 71  Whilst a relatively recent 
development in international law, springing as it has from the Nuremberg Tribunals following 
World War II, ICL has gone a long way to place human security at the forefront of 
international legal development. In respect of an analysis of any right of humanitarian 
intervention, the precise definition of an international crime may be debated, but it is 
noteworthy that ICL concerns itself with the most serious crimes that are the concern of the 
international community as a whole.72 For present purposes, these include genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and aggression. The first three constitute a way by which ICL 
responds to violations of certain provisions of IHRL and IHL that concern the protection of 
individuals. The latter focuses on inter-State conflict and relates to one of the risks to States 
posed by humanitarian intervention.73 Certain other risks will be discussed in Section III.  
 
1. ICL and the turn to human security 
 
                                                        
67 A State may of course invoke the international responsibility of another State for breaches of IHL under the 
International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries, in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, UN Doc 
A/56/10 (2001) (ARSIWA). Such invocation is subject to peaceable dispute resolution, which will be discussed 
in Section II(E) below.  
68 A belligerent reprisal ‘consists of action which would normally be contrary to [IHL] but which is justified 
because it is taken by one party to an armed conflict against another party in response to the latter’s violation of 
[IHL] – for example, the use of prohibited weapons in retaliation for their prior use by an adversary.’ C 
Greenwood, Essays on War in International Law (Cameron May 2006) 297. See further F Kalshoven, Belligerent 
Reprisals (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005). 
69 See Greenwood, ibid 309-315, for discussion of this development and the general trend against the use of 
belligerent reprisals, most notably pursuant to the express prohibitions stipulated by the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and API. 
70 For further discussion regarding related controversies and the exceptions to the specific prohibitions, see 
Greenwood, ibid 315-325; Dinstein (n 45) 253-261. Certain States continue to defend the legality of belligerent 
reprisals, albeit under strict conditions, see UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 
(Oxford University Press 2005) paras 16.16 – 16.19.2. 
71 R Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2010) 3, 13.  
72 See e.g. Arts 1 and 5(1) ICC Statute.  
73 Whilst an agreed definition is lacking under customary international law and the ICC has yet to have its 
jurisdiction ‘activated’ for such a crime, humanitarian intervention could potentially lead to individual criminal 
responsibility for senior military and political leaders for the crime of aggression. See Cryer et al (n 71) 312-333. 
For analysis that humanitarian intervention might not constitute the crime of aggression, see J Trahan, ‘Defining 
the ‘grey area’ where humanitarian intervention may not be fully legal, but is not the crime of aggression’ (2015) 
2 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 42. 
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The contribution that ICL has made to human security is significant. As discussed in the 
previous section, the ICC and customary international law (most notably via the ICTY case 
law) have increasingly focused on protecting victims of international crimes and bringing the 
perpetrators to justice. Indeed, the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
were specifically set up in response to egregious breaches of human rights. In this respect, ICL 
serves to enforce IHRL and IHL. Such enforcement is against individuals and, at the 
international level, is regardless of their official status or seniority, including heads of State.74 
As part of Teitel’s ‘humanity law’ and Bethlehem’s ‘tapestry’ of justifications for a right 
of humanitarian intervention, ICL may therefore be viewed as a key component. Whilst its 
effectiveness may be debated, ICL further entrenches into international law humanitarian 
values and the protection of individuals. It circumscribes the freedoms of individuals 
regardless of their position within the State and seeks to hold them to account. ICL thereby 
limits a State’s ability to act within or without its own borders. Importantly, where 
international law imposes obligations directly on individuals, these transcend the obligations 
imposed on them by the State.75 This superiority of international law means that violations of 
ICL cannot be justified by reference to national law. ICL thereby contributes to an 
understanding of sovereignty that recognizes a State’s obligation to individuals and also to a 
higher order of supervision and regulation.  
Universal jurisdiction has been an integral part of this normative development. Whilst not 
without controversy, it is sufficiently well agreed that universal jurisdiction permits the 
assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction by a State over certain international crimes76  in the 
absence of any other jurisdictional nexus. This includes the lack of any connection based on 
territory or the nationality of the suspect or victim that links the prosecuting State to the crime 
in question.77 This entitles States to assert jurisdiction over a limited number of offences 
committed abroad by individuals who are not nationals or residents of that State. This appears 
supportive of a right of humanitarian intervention, as egregious breaches of human rights are 
likely to be candidates for these crimes and universal jurisdiction gives any State a potential 
interest in punishing the perpetrators. It indicates a preference for accountability over 
deference to sovereignty and points to a focus on human security. In principle at least, States 
may now concern themselves with actions occurring within other States and to enforce 
international law where such States are failing to do so. 
 
2. Impact on external sovereignty  
 
This right of interference by one State into the domestic sphere of another State based on ICL 
is limited however. Firstly, as noted above, universal jurisdiction is purely prescriptive and a 
distinction must therefore be made with the enforcement of ICL. Whilst the ability of a State 
to prescribe may be extra-territorial, the right to enforce is purely territorial and relies on an 
alleged perpetrator being within a State’s territory. Enforcement jurisdiction cannot be 
exercised by a State outside its territory, except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from 
international custom or treaty.78 The principles of non-intervention and territorial integrity are 
therefore preserved by ICL, despite its advancements in protecting individuals and combating 
impunity. Second, the operation of universal jurisdiction preserves State consent and external 
                                                        
74 See e.g Art 27(1) ICC Statute. Although they may be entitled to immunity from prosecution before domestic 
courts. See section II(E)(2) below. 
75 Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 1946 (1947) 41 AJIL 172, 221. 
76 These include war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, as defined by customary international law, R 
O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 22-6. 
77 ibid 17-18.  
78 SS “Lotus” (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ Ser A, No 10, 18-9.  
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sovereignty. As with the operation of IHRL, it retains States as ‘part of the dialogue’, without 
imposing enforcement of the primary norm upon them. So, whether a State will in fact exercise 
universal jurisdiction over these core international crimes and prosecute individuals in their 
territory is a question of right. For customary ICL at least, there does not appear to be any 
obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction.79 This is in contrast to universal jurisdiction 
grounded in such treaties as the Convention Against Torture (UNCAT),80 which imposes an 
obligation on States to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction, involving a duty to prosecute 
or extradite an accused present in its territory (an obligation aut dedere aut judicare).81 
However, such treaty obligation applies only inter partes82 and is therefore a consequence of 
State consent. This has important implications for State immunity, which will be discussed 
below.  
The decisive point for present purposes is that, whilst developments in ICL have 
increasingly protected individuals, its focus is on ascribing individual criminal responsibility. 
At the international level, it is a means of enforcing humanitarian protections by holding 
individuals to account, not States. Crucially, this occurs in a network of courts and tribunals 
tasked to deal with cases ex post facto. It is also notable that ICL expressly preserves external 
sovereignty. Domestic courts are seen as an integral part of the ICL framework and the pursuit 
of impunity.83 In fact, the ICC adopts a presumption of State action in respect of enforcement. 
This is expressed in Article 17 of the ICC Statute, which sets out the principle of 
complementarity. The focus therefore is on domestic prosecutions, with the ICC only stepping 
in as a court of last resort where national proceedings fail. This reinforces State power and the 
principle of non-intervention. It also reminds us that the ICC is a creature of statute and an 
expression of sovereign will. States may choose (or not) to sign up to the ICC Statute and/or 
to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC.84  These factors together militate against a right of 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
E.  Secondary rules - enforceability and violation  
 
Humanitarian intervention is preventative in nature: force is deployed to prevent or stop 
egregious violations of human rights. It is also, per se, a means of enforcing primary human 
rights norms by the application of military force. The determinative question is whether this 
approach to violation and enforcement of primary norms fits within the fabric of international 
law more generally. The foregoing analysis suggests that primary rules of international law 
are focusing increasingly on human security and that State sovereignty is not inviolable. 
These positive developments in IHL, IHRL and ICL potentially further the case for a right of 
humanitarian intervention. This evolution is not unfettered however. As has been 
demonstrated above, a distinction must be made between, on the one hand, potentially 
‘humanitarian intervention-friendly’ advancements in primary norms of international law 
and, on the other, the operation of secondary rules that relate to their enforcement and respond 
to their infringement. These secondary rules are not supportive of Bethlehem’s tapestry 
                                                        
79 H Fox and P Webb, The Law of State Immunity (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 567.  
80 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 
1984, 1465 UNTS 85. 
81 Arts 5-7 UNCAT.  
82 A Cassese, 'Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction' (2003) 
1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 589, 594.  
83 Noted in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (Judgment) [2002] 
ICJ Rep 3, Joint Separate Opinion, para 51.  
84 The exception is a UNSC referral to the ICC under Chapter VII UN Charter. An example is the Darfur referral 
pursuant to UNSC Res 1593 (2005) UN Doc S/RES/1593. 
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argument for humanitarian intervention. Most significantly, as Crawford notes, inter-State 
disputes will normally be settled via diplomatic means, with other enforcement processes, 
including countermeasures and litigation, being very much a last resort.85 All such means of 
dispute resolution however show deference to external sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention. In certain instances, such rules may even specifically prevent enforcement of 
the primary norms or restrict whether or not redress or remedies are available to victims for 
their breach. This approach recognizes the fact that international law may necessarily 
prioritize other concerns over and above the protection of individuals and the enforcement of 
their rights.   
 
1. International dispute resolution  
 
In terms of dispute resolution at the international level, as noted, the jurisdiction of 
international courts and tribunals operates on the basis of State consent. For any right of 
humanitarian intervention, this is particularly relevant to the enforcement of IHRL and how 
international law reacts to infractions. In this regard, at most, States have consented (or not) 
to monitoring by a treaty body or ex post facto peaceful dispute resolution by a human rights 
court. This includes the compulsory jurisdiction and binding decisions under the ECHR, 
which is the strongest example of human rights enforcement at the international level. IHRL 
does not contemplate a legal option of prevention, enforcement or redress that involves the 
unilateral use of force. This is the case even if the human rights norm breached has jus cogens 
status. As DRC v Rwanda confirms, jurisdiction, and thereby norm enforcement at the 
international level, is dependent on State consent, even if the breach in question is as serious 
as genocide.86 Also worth noting is the principle of subsidiarity present in both regional and 
international human rights treaties. This focuses on enforcement at the national level and 
requires that domestic remedies be exhausted before an individual may seek redress beyond 
the boundaries of the relevant State.87 As with the margin of appreciation given to States to 
implement the ECHR, deference to sovereignty and State power remains. This shows that, in 
true R2P-style, the protection of human rights begins with States.  
The enforcement of human rights (whether under the UN Charter system, the various 
UN-backed treaties or the regional regimes) therefore relies on the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. Redress and any available remedies for victims of violation of human rights norms 
are provided ex post facto by such dispute resolution. This approach accords with the UN 
Charter’s general emphasis on the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations,88 which 
contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security. It is also in tune with the 
limitations on how States may protect their own nationals abroad. This is by means of 
diplomatic protection, which may only be by non-forcible means. 89 The fact that States do 
not have a clear right to use force to protect their own nationals abroad does not logically 
                                                        
85 Crawford and Koskenniemi (n 10) 124. 
86 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) 
(Judgment) [2006] ICJ Rep 6, para 64.  
87 E.g. Art 35 ECHR. 
88 Arts 1(1), 2(3), 33 UN Charter. This is echoed by the Friendly Relations Declaration affirmation of the 
‘principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security and justice are not endangered.’ 
89 Art 1 of The ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006), UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1 (Part 2) 
confines the definition of diplomatic protection to ‘diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement’. The 
right to use force more generally to protect nationals is controversial and academic opinion and State practice is 
divided. See e.g C Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 156-
160. 
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support a right of intervention to protect the nationals of another State where their rights are 
being abused. The result is that this most classic expression of State sovereignty (i.e a State 
protecting its own rights90) is subject to the weightier considerations of the non-use of force 
and the territorial integrity of the State in which the national is located. 
Ultimately, consent to jurisdiction and to peaceful dispute resolution preserves external 
sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. It demonstrates that enforcement of 
primary rules of international law and responses to their violation are contingent on State 
consent. This is regardless of the status of the norm or the gravity of the breach. Sovereignty 
may thereby act as a shield to prevention or enforcement at the international level. That 
international law so strongly prioritizes consent for the enforcement of public order norms is 
not supportive of any putative right of humanitarian intervention. Both consent and territorial 
integrity are key elements of sovereignty. However, a violation of the latter by an exercise of 
humanitarian intervention is more serious than dispensing with the former, due to the 
potential ensuing risks for international peace and security in the event of escalation. 
Therefore, as State consent is preserved and protected as a foundational principle of the 
international legal system, a logical corollary to this fact is that territorial integrity should 
likewise be preserved by its attendant guardian principle of non-intervention. These principles 
feed into maintaining peace and stability. Whenever there is any tension or conflict between 
human rights and peace therefore, peace must always prevail.91 
 
2. Domestic dispute resolution 
 
This trend continues in the national forum. In terms of enforcement options in domestic courts 
and how victims may seek redress there, the default premise is that States may not exercise 
the jurisdiction of their courts over other States. The proper forum for redress in such 
circumstances is the invocation of an internationally wrongful act against such State.92 That 
said, an inroad has been made in respect of functional immunity93 in criminal cases. This is 
in keeping with the growing importance of ICL and IHRL and exemplifies that the shield of 
sovereignty is increasingly permeable and cannot be used to flout individual rights. In 
Pinochet,94 which is the leading authority on this development, the House of Lords handed 
down a ground-breaking judgment that Senator Pinochet was not entitled to immunity ratione 
materiae in respect of the international crime of torture. The Pinochet rationale shows that 
those who breach human rights and commit crimes of international concern may face justice 
by being held criminally responsible before municipal courts. This approach prioritizes to 
some degree individual rights over respect for State sovereignty and immunity. It shows that 
the latter is a relative concept and that international law is willing to introduce accountability 
into the equation. However, the rationale and proper extent of this exception to functional 
immunity is controversial. It is a nascent development and it is notable that immunity ratione 
personae remains an absolute bar to both criminal and civil domestic proceedings (although 
debate remains over which senior officials benefit).95 Immunity as a function of external 
sovereignty thereby remains central to international law.  
                                                        
90 By diplomatically protecting their citizens, States protect their own sovereign rights, not those of the individual. 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v U.K.) (1924) PCIJ Ser A, No 2, 12. 
91 A Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian 
Countermeasures in the World Community?’ (1999) 10 EJIL 23, 24.  
92 Fox and Webb (n 79) 537.  
93 Or immunity ratione materiae, that attaches to the acts of State officials. 
94 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 
AC 147. 
95 Arrest Warrant (n 83) para 51. 
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In addition, the exception to immunity does not apply to civil proceedings.96 This 
distinction is important for the review of external sovereignty. In Germany v Italy, following 
its approach in DRC v Rwanda, the ICJ confirmed that rules on immunity are procedural and 
cannot conflict with substantive jus cogens norms. 97  This strict procedure/substance 
distinction is open to criticism, especially given the gravity of the alleged breaches in question 
and the fact that no alternative remedy was available to the claimant. Furthermore, in respect 
of universal jurisdiction, the distinction is less clear as the substance of the norm has important 
procedural consequences.98 Ultimately, where enforcement of the norm and an effective 
remedy for its breach are blocked by immunity, this is not simply a question of procedure.  
Yet, given this approach by the various domestic and international courts, the 
distinction is likely to be followed going forward. It shows that, regardless of the 
consequential restriction on access to justice, the gravity of the breach in question or the status 
of the norm breached, international law may prioritize States and their external sovereignty 
over individual redress and remedies and even life itself. Crucially, it may be right to do so. 
The Pinochet exception services the premise that ICL, in attributing criminal responsibility 
to individuals (and fighting impunity), has less need to shield officials from responsibility 
that would normally attach to their State. In the civil context however, the adherence to State 
immunity is both proportionate and necessary ‘to promote comity and good relations between 
States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty’.99 It recognizes that immunity is 
required for the proper functioning of international relations and the freedom of movement 
and action of diplomats and officials, all of which contribute to international peace and 
security. As noted in the previous section, international law may therefore have priorities over 
and above individual rights. Respect for external sovereignty, by granting immunity, is an 
essential element of this fact. 
 
3. Wrongfulness preclusion - countermeasures and necessity  
 
In terms of other secondary rules of international law, if humanitarian intervention could 
constitute a countermeasure, then this would preclude any wrongfulness that would otherwise 
be incurred by an internationally wrongful act (being a breach of Article 2(4) UN Charter).100 
Article 48(1)(b) ARSIWA envisages that States other than an ‘injured State’ may invoke 
responsibility in the collective interest for breaches of obligations ‘owed to the international 
community as a whole’. This codification of the Barcelona Traction dictum recognizes that 
certain obligations (including genocide and basic human rights) are erga omnes and are 
therefore the concern of all States.101 This right of standing for third States to invoke an 
internationally wrongful act on an actio popularis basis might seem supportive of a right of 
humanitarian intervention. However, the right has limits. Whilst so called ‘non-injured States’ 
may have an interest in the breach of an obligation erga omnes and may call for its cessation 
and for reparations under Article 48(2) ARSIWA, Article 54 only contemplates such States 
taking lawful measures against the wrongdoing State. The ILC commentary on Article 54 
concludes however, that there is no clearly recognized right to take collective 
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countermeasures102 and, in any event, it is clear that countermeasures may not involve the 
threat or use of force.103 Therefore, whilst an egregious breach of human rights triggers the 
right of the wider international community to invoke State responsibility, the abilities of such 
third States to respond to a breach are expressly limited to peaceful means. There is no right 
under the laws of State responsibility to use force to suppress or prevent it. 
As an alternative to countermeasures, States may invoke necessity to preclude the 
wrongfulness of an act if it ‘is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril’.104 The ILC commentary to Article 25 refers to essential 
interests of the State or of the international community as a whole.105 Relying on necessity to 
excuse an otherwise illegal use of force on the basis that it is used to suppress or prevent 
violations of obligations erga omnes faces significant problems however. Firstly, Article 25 
is drafted in the negative, with the ICJ’s conclusion being that States may only invoke it in 
exceptional circumstances.106 Second, invocation is disbarred if the international obligation 
in question (being Article 2(4) UN Charter) excludes the possibility of invoking necessity.107 
If we accept that Article 2(4) constitutes an absolute prohibition on the use of force, subject 
only to the explicit exceptions set out in the UN Charter, then on its own terms Article 2(4) 
likely prevents wrongfulness preclusion on the basis of humanitarian intervention. A fortiori 
if Article 2(4) is characterised as jus cogens. 108  Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, 
necessity may not be invoked where the actions taken ‘seriously impair an essential interest 
of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community 
as a whole.’109 The interest relied on (being the protection of human security) must therefore 
outweigh all other considerations.110 For a right of humanitarian intervention, this seems an 
impossible conclusion to draw given the foundational and essential interests of external 
sovereignty and territorial integrity that are violated by intervention and its wider implications 
for international peace and security. As such, a plea of necessity is not supportive of a right 
of humanitarian intervention.  
 
 
 
 
III. THE DANGERS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
 
The focus of international law therefore in enforcing human rights norms and responding to 
their breaches is on ex post facto peaceful dispute resolution and holding individual 
perpetrators to account under ICL. Preventative action using force is not an option. The 
operation of secondary rules emphasize that fact and, in so doing, prioritize international peace 
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and security. Yet, these peaceable routes to implementation, accountability and justice are not 
always available. In respect of Syria for example, one concern has been the lack of means by 
which to achieve justice and accountability for victims.111 However, even where human rights 
protection is absent or where justice may go unanswered for their breach, this does not mean 
that humanitarian intervention should be used to prevent or stop human rights abuses. Nor 
should it be applied to fill any gaps in either the enforcement or the accountability framework. 
The dangers of humanitarian intervention (not addressed by Bethlehem when knitting together 
his tapestry argument) are too great.  
These dangers, for the State intervening, the State in whose territory the intervention is 
occurring and for the people who reside there, are many. A full discussion of them is beyond 
the confines of this article. For present purposes and the consideration of the effect on the wider 
fabric of international law however, it is worth highlighting two key dangers. The first is the 
essential, and essentially non-legal, question of whether military interference might improve 
the situation or make it worse. Libya is not an example of humanitarian intervention, as it took 
place under the auspices of a UNSC authorisation to use all necessary measures to protect the 
civilians of Libya. 112 However, it exemplifies the difficulties involved in this analysis. Whilst 
humanitarian aims were expressed at the time of the intervention, Germany and Brazil for 
example raised concerns in the UNSC that intervention might make matters worse.113 Such 
concerns were prescient. Today, the human rights situation in Libya remains appalling, with 
purported violations of IHRL, IHL and ICL and the breakdown of security and the rule of 
law. 114  Libya is now viewed as a failed State. 115  This begs the question whether the 
humanitarian goals were ultimately achieved and whether it is ever possible to say for definite 
that intervention will or can lead to the improvement of usually very complicated situations on 
the ground. In short, can humanitarian intervention really be said to be capable of advancing 
humanitarianism and human security in the way that might be envisaged?  
The second and, perhaps main, practical argument against a right of humanitarian 
intervention is its auto-determinative nature. Such a right would give competence to a State (or 
group of States), acting outside UNSC authorization and the collective security framework of 
the UN Charter, to breach the territorial integrity of another State. States would therefore be 
granted the capacity to assess the effectiveness of the UNSC and, if judged to be failing, to act 
in its stead. This is contrary to the content and spirit of the UN Charter and is dangerous for 
international peace and security and the primacy of the UNSC in protecting it. Unilateral 
intervention to protect human security should not become an independent exception or 
substitute for collective action. This is particularly so when one considers the potential motives 
for humanitarian intervention, which may be political or geared towards certain foreign policy 
objectives. The fear is therefore of abuse of the right, whereby stronger States use humanitarian 
intervention as a pretext for interfering in their less powerful neighbours. Russia's recent 
statements and actions regarding Ukraine are a case in point and show how humanitarian 
intervention can fit neatly into a powerful neighbour’s alternative foreign policy agenda. In this 
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case, President Putin drew on Kosovo as a precedent for intervention in Ukraine, stating that it 
was ‘a humanitarian mission’. 116 This shows the dangers of setting precedents of humanitarian 
intervention and adopting wide R2P style terminology as a pretext for aggressive and unlawful 
behaviour. This raises a further difficulty of how such actions are to be reviewed and how they 
may be held accountable. 117  Regime change 118  and other more dubious grounds for 
intervention that suit a State’s own national foreign policy or security interests might also be 
mixed up with alleged humanitarian concerns. The proper purpose of the use of force for any 
right of humanitarian intervention is essential therefore and where other motivations for 
intervention are also present, they cast doubt on the morality and legitimacy of any 
humanitarian objectives. Uses of force cannot and should not serve as a short cut to 
international justice or as a means of punishment.119  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Bethlehem’s tapestry argument provides a degree of superficial support for a right of 
humanitarian intervention. As does the paradigm shift towards Teitel’s humanity law, where 
normative foundations are emphasizing human rather than State security. This pluralistic 
understanding of sovereignty demonstrates that international law is less State centric and that 
sovereignty is conditional and a responsibility. However, these developments only take the 
argument for humanitarian intervention so far. The evolution of IHRL, IHL and ICL is 
progressive and on-going and, whilst the focus on individuals and their security is increasing, 
its ability to account for humanitarian concerns is circumscribed. Vitally, secondary rules that 
might enforce or reflect these developments are weak. There is therefore a lack of support in 
the turn to ‘humanity law’ or any right of humanitarian intervention. Instead, these rules 
underscore State consent, peaceful dispute resolution and ex post facto accountability. The 
latter is notably via ICL, where enforcement and accountability take place in a courtroom rather 
than through military means. Therefore, whilst individuals are seen increasingly as bearers of 
rights and active subjects or participants in international law, there are limitations on their 
protection and the potential for international law to monitor and curb State power.  
The reports of the death of sovereignty are thereby much exaggerated, 120 but the nature of 
both internal and external sovereignty has certainly changed in the post war years. States do 
not have absolute discretion to act within or without their own borders. However, the 
restrictions on either type of sovereignty must not be overstated. In particular, even if we 
understand it to be less State-centric, external sovereignty in the Westphalian sense remains at 
the core of international law. Whilst it no longer provides a licence to abuse human rights 
underneath an impermeable shell of protection, it may still act as a shield to the enforcement 
of primary norms. States are not the sole centres of legal power, but they remain the only ‘full 
legal person’ on the international stage and sovereignty remains a strong bulwark against 
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external interference and intervention. This may even extend, as seen in the case of immunity, 
to trumping breaches of human rights.  
These secondary rules create their own tapestry of international law, one that recognizes 
higher priorities such as the prohibition on the use of force,121 the comity of nations and the 
proper functioning of the international order. A right of humanitarian intervention would 
endanger this. The very concept risks tearing a hole in that tapestry. Therefore, when the 
enforcement and protection of human rights is pitted against preserving external sovereignty 
and international peace and security, human rights must lose.  In addition, as part of assessing 
the role of humanitarian intervention in the international legal order, the risks and dangers of 
its abuse, doubts as to its efficacy and its position in the wider context of collective security 
raise substantial concerns. Article 2(4) is under great strain in the post 9/11 world and further 
exceptions would only further endanger international peace and stability. That said, placing the 
exclusive right to use force to protect human rights in the hands of the UNSC raises its own 
issues. As the case of Syria shows, the power of the veto may prove fatal to preventing 
humanitarian disasters. Yet, rather than pointing to a need for humanitarian intervention, this 
arguably speaks more strongly in favour of institutional and procedural reform of the UN. 
Ultimately, none of Bethlehem’s ‘threads’ on their own support a right of humanitarian 
intervention and weaving them together does not make the fabric any stronger. A close analysis 
shows that the tapestry all too easily unravels. The result is that, even if the wider fabric of 
international law points to a pluralistic understanding of sovereignty, a right of humanitarian 
intervention does not and should not fit within it. 
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